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I. INTRODUCTION
The model of human behavior that is used in microeconomics
is both normative and descriptive. As a normative model, it is an
historical successor to the medieval concept of grace and the
Renaissance concept of virtue. As a descriptive model, it is a theory of
human psychology. Economists tend to deemphasize this point be-
cause psychology is a notoriously "soft" science, and economists aspire
to the "hard" sciences' precision. Nonetheless, any model that states
the way human beings behave under specified circumstances is neces-
sarily a theory of the way the human mind functions, and thus be-
longs in the category of psychology.
The particular brand of psychology that microeconomics pro-
pounds is generally called rational actor theory, and comes in two
varieties. The "weak" or "thin" variety states that people's behavior is
generally designed to maximize their ability to achieve their goals.
The "strong" or "thick" variety, which quite correctly declares itself to
be a subset of the first, states that people's behavior is generally de-
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This research was funded
by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It is part of a larger project about
reconceptualizing concepts of law and politics in the administrative state.
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signed to maximize their ability to achieve the particular goal of their
material self-interest. Because terms such as weak or strong, thick or
thin, carry extraneous connotations, the first variety will be described
in this Article as rational actor theory, and the second will be de-
scribed as rational choice theory.
Both of these psychological models have been subjected to
sustained criticism, ranging from minor emendations to outright
rejections. The essence of this criticism has been that these models,
although they possess a simplicity that makes them easy to apply, are
unrealistic accounts of human behavior. Originally the criticism was
based on what may be called macro-empirics, that is, observations
about large-scale behaviors such as altruism, self-sacrifice, ideological
commitment, and cooperation.' In recent years, a new criticism,
based on what may be called micro-empirics, or behavioral economics,
has been articulated. This is essentially a set of laboratory studies
which suggest that people in a variety of simple experimental settings
do not behave in a rational manner. Instead, their behavior displays
a variety of systematic irrationalities that include endowment effects,
regret, and excessive optimism.2
While these empirically based criticisms of rational actor the-
ory seem convincing, rational actor theory itself has been confirmed
by other empirical tests that seem equally convincing. One strategy
for resolving this conflict is to assume that the theory is in fact a com-
prehensive account of human behavior, and that its subsequent devel-
opments, unknown at present, will be able to explain the apparently
disconfirming data. The difficulty with this approach, however, is
that it is based on an unjustified assumption that rational actor the-
ory is correct. In addition, the theory's existing explanations, as they
are extended across an increasingly wide range of behaviors, are
already becoming counterintuitively complex. A second strategy for
resolving the conflict is to assume that rational actor theory only
operates over a delimited range of behaviors, and that the situations
identified by the macro- and micro-empirical criticisms are explained
by a different theory. This approach has the advantage of being based
on the data as it presently exists, and of potentially offering more
1. See generally DONALD GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY (1994); STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY (1987); JOHN KINGDON,
CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (3d ed. 1989); LEIF LEWIN, SELF-INTEREST AND PUBLIC
INTEREST IN WESTERN POLITICS (1991); Michael Taylor, When Rationality Fails, in THE
RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY 223 (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 1996).
2. See generally JUDGENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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intuitively appealing explanations. It requires, however, that the
boundary between rational actor theory and its alternatives be
defined and that these alternatives be described by some positive
theory of their own, rather than by uninformative negations like
"irrational."
This Article offers a preliminary version of this second resolu-
tion. It argues that rational actor theory, and its rational choice com-
ponent, are accurate theories of human psychology, but only in a lim-
ited range of situations. The limitations occur because these theories
are actually subsets of a larger, more comprehensive theory, namely
phenomenology. Phenomenology accounts for all the explanations
that rational action and rational choice theory offer for human behav-
ior, and also accounts for the limitations of those theories. It defines
the boundary between the areas where people will behave rationally,
in either sense of the term, and the areas where they will not, and it
offers an explanation for human behavior in those areas where
rational choice does not apply.
Part II of the Article describes phenomenology. The next part
describes rational actor theory and its rational choice component.
Part IV relates phenomenology to rational actor and rational choice
theory, and explains how it is congruent with those theories. The
final part explains how phenomenology diverges from those theories
and accounts for the macro- and micro-empirical findings that those
theories fail to explain.
II. HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenology, developed by Edmund Husserl, represents his
effort to ground philosophic thought on an absolutely pure, incontest-
able foundation.3 This effort proceeds in two basic stages. The first
3. The description of Husserl's philosophy in this Article is based primarily upon three of
his works, all of which-characteristically-were designated as "introductions" by Husserl.
These are: CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHEOMENOLOGY (Dorian Cairns
trans., 1973) [hereinafter HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS]; IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., 1962) [hereinafter HUSSERL, IDEAS]; THE
CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY (David Carr trans., 1970) [hereinafter HUSSERL, CRISIS]. The
Northwestern University Press edition of CRISIS appends several other documents not part of
the book itself upon which it relies. Most notable are a lecture given in Vienna in 1935, see
HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra, at 269-99 [hereinafter Husserl, Vienna Lecture], and The Origin of
Geometry, see HuSSERL, CRISIS, supra, at 353-78 [hereinafter Husserl, Origin of Geometry].
Another source for Husseri's ideas that is particularly useful for the present inquiry is ALFRED
SCHUTZ, COLLECTED PAPERS (Helmut Wagner & George Psathas eds., 1996). Not only was
Schutz a disciple of Husserl's, but Husserl read his work and approved it as an accurate
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analyzes the world, or what Husserl describes as the "lifeworld"-the
totality which surrounds us as individuals-and the "natural
attitude" that we adopt within that world.4 The second is a
"phenomenological reduction" by which we set aside, or "bracket", all
the validity claims that we assert within the natural attitude and
reassess, from a position of radical doubt, the nature of our percep-
tions, our thought processes, and our identity.5 Only the first stage is
directly relevant for the present discussion.
According to Husserl, all our knowledge of the world comes to
us through our own experience as individuals. As he states at the
very beginning of his first general description of phenomenology,
"Natural knowledge begins with experience and remains within expe-
rience."6 Our thoughts, our perceptions, our theories, and our com-
mitments are all matters of individual experience, which means that
they occur within the ambit of a single human mind. What is under-
stood by "humanity"; what is practiced by "society"; what is believed
by the "community" is, in the final analysis, only what is held within
the minds and contained within the experiences of concrete human
beings.7
The claim that all knowledge is a matter of individual experience
carries with it a number of important consequences--consequences which
Husserl explores through the concepts of pre-givenness, intentionality,
interpretation, meaning, intersubjectivity, and sedimentation.
Because we are born into the world, and all our experiences are
experiences of the world's reality, or more precisely, its facticity, we
experience that world as pre-given, taken-for-granted, and irrefutable.
application of his own ideas. See MAURICE NATANSON, EDMUND HussERL: PHILOSOPHER OF
INrrNITE TASKS 106 (1973).
4. HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra note 3, at 103-35; HussERL, IDEAS, supra note 3, at 91-97.
5. See HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 3, at 7-26; HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra
note 3, at 148-89; HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 3, at 99-167; see also RUDOLOF BERNET ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO HUSsER IAN PHENomENOLOGY 58-87 (1993); Herman Philipse,
Transcendental Idealism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUSSERL 239, 239-322 (Barry
Smith & David W. Smith eds., 1995).
6. HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 3, at 51 (emphasis omitted).
7. See id. at 48-51, 91-96. This insight, although adumbrated by a somewhat earlier
group of thinkers, most notably Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dilthey, was given its decisive
formulation by Husserl. It is the seminal insight of twentieth century continental thought, and
the primary source of its divide from the Anglo-American tradition. From it flows Husserl's own
philosophy; that of his self-declared disciples, such as Schutz, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur; the
philosophy of Heidegger; and that of the existentialists like Sartre and the hermeneuticists like
Gadamer who count themselves as Heidegger's disciples. It serves, moreover, as the starting
point for Levinas, whose first book was about Husserl; for Derrida, whose first book was also
about Husserl; for the later Wittgenstein; and for Foucault. When combined with Marxism, it
generated the Frankfurt School of Horkheiner, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas, as well as the
work of neo-Marxists and post-Marxists such as Gramsci and Lefebvre.
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In Heidegger's phraseology, we are irretrievably "thrown" into this
world;8 as Husserl says, it is the world "I find to be out there, and also
take it just as it gives itself to me."9 Husserl describes this experience
as the "natural attitude." He circumvents the age-old debate between
realism and idealism by asserting that the world, as an experienced
facticity, precedes any questions about its metaphysical reality.10
But the natural attitude should not be regarded as the passive
acceptance of inflowing sensory data by the individual. It is, rather,
the stance that people take toward the reality that they experience in
all their modes of thought: not only observing, but also theorizing,
analyzing, speculating, or creating. These processes are always ac-
tive. They involve, in Husserl's view, an intentional act, specifically,
an intending of the object being thought about." When observing an
object, we intend it as that object, which is why we are able to see
something from different angles and yet identify it, unproblemati-
cally, as a single entity. When imagining an object, we similarly in-
tend that object, even though we know that it is not really there.
Indeed, the ease with which any person can think about non-existent
objects, such as "winged steeds, white ravens, golden
mountains"'12-as part of the creative process, for example-indicates
the active, intentional quality of human thought. This capacity,
however, does not place us beyond the natural attitude; we recognize
these non-existent objects as unreal, and indeed are able to conceive
of them at all, because we accept the world that we perceive as pre-
given and irrefutable. 3
8. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIM 174, 219-24 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., 1962).
9. HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 3, at 96.
10. Husserl's analysis presents philosophic difficulties of its own, of course. See generally
PAUL RICOEUR, HUSSERL: AN ANALYSIS OF HIS PHENOMENOLOGY 16-20 (Edward Ballard &
Lester Embree trans., 1967) (addressing some of the gaps and inconsistencies in Husserrs
phenomenology); Barry Smith, Common Sense, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUSSERL,
supra note 5, at 394, 394-437. The point here is not that it is philosophically incontestable, but
that it is a seminal account whose basic features provide insights for social science. See
generally ScI-I=Z, supra note 3.
11. See HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, supra note 3, at 41-50; HUSSERL, CRISIS,
supra note 3, at 82-91; HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 3, at 105-20, 220-26; see also RODOLF
BERNET ETAL., supra note 5, at 88-101.
12. HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 3, at 380.
13. Those who object to movies that contain graphic violence or sex are sometimes de-
scribed, or describe themselves, as claiming that impressionable viewers will be induced to kill
or rape because they cannot adequately distinguish between illusion and reality. But the real
objection is that some viewers will have their passions aroused or their imaginations stimu-
lated. No one claims that these viewers think they are in a movie when they commit their
crime. In fact, such a claim would defeat criminal responsibility. There is some belief that
young children confuse illusion and reality, and toy companies, presumably at the suggestion of
their attorneys, sometimes place disclaimers on items like Superman capes, saying "Warning-
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The intended character of thought, when combined with the
individual nature of experience, indicates that the world in which
each individual exists is interpreted and constructed by that
individual. Because the individual intends her thoughts, she does not
merely receive raw sensory data, but organizes the data she receives
into distinguishable objects or comprehensible ideas. Modern
physiological research supports this view; the sensory impulses
received by the retina do not contain nearly as much detail or clarity
as the images the brain constructs.14 The Impressionist painters, who
reached their peak during Husserl's formative years, made this
insight central to their work. Approached closely, more closely than
Western people ordinarily view paintings, Impressionist canvasses
consist of splashes, streaks, and dots of color. At a normal distance,
the mind resolves these bits of visual data into recognizable objects.
The point of painting in this way lies partially in the technical
virtuosity of generating the effect, but also in the painting's ability to
capture the liveliness, the intensity, of our world by recreating the
interpretive process by which we perceive it. 15 Husserl insists that all
thoughts, even simple ones like "that's a tree," are intended actions of
the individual, generating the basic insight that these thoughts
possess an interpretive character.
Although all thought is interpretive, it is not thereby uniform
in nature; while casual thoughts are a good deal less casual, in
Husserl's view, than they are ordinarily regarded as being, they are
nonetheless distinct from our more ordered or articulated mental
efforts. The distinction, however, does not reside in the process of
interpretation, which is a universal aspect of perception. Rather, it
depends upon what Husserl calls our internal time consciousness.
Very much like his contemporary, James Joyce, Husserl regards the
temporal aspect of our conscious experience as a flow, or stream, of
primordial impressions. We retain these impressions briefly as they
vanish into the past, and anticipate them partially as they proxi-
This garment will not enable you to fly." To the extent that this is true, however, it does not
indicate a rejection of the natural attitude, but only a misevaluation of impressions received
within our all-embracing world.
14. See PATRICIA S. CHuRcHIAND & TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, THE COMPUTATIONAL BRAIN
141-238 (1992). See generally STANLEY COREN ET AL., SENSATION AND PERCEPTION (1989);
RICHARD L. GREGORY, THE INTELLIGENT EYE (1970); RICHARD L. GREGORY, EYE AND BRAIN: TiE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SEEING (1997); DAvID HUBEL, EYE, BRAIN, AND VISION (1988).
15. In philosophy, the concept of interpretation was extended and elaborated by
Heidegger, Ricoeur, Gadamer, and other hermeneuticists. Gadamer, for example, argues that
since our entire experience of the world is an interpretive one, the interpretation of written
texts can serve as a model for all human knowledge. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD (Garret Barden & John Cumming eds., 1988).
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mately approach. Higher mental efforts occur when we direct our
attention to certain experiences that have passed through this
stream: We direct our glance towards some object of recollection
which chances to occur to us. 16 By intending these experiences as
subjects of our mental attention, we confer meaning on them, that is,
we place them in a framework or context that has some sort of signifi-
cance for us beyond their mere occurrence. 17 Husserl uses the term
"meaning" rather restrictively, but his disciple Alfred Schutz gives it
the more expansive definition that corresponds to ordinary usage.18
According to Schutz, meaning is the individual's way of ordering the
world so that it is both comprehensible and emotionally satisfying, or
at least emotionally tolerable. It is, in Schutz's formulation, the way
that an individual reflects upon past experience, and is the basis of
any projects that the individual might undertake. For present pur-
poses, the idea of meaning can be limited to its role as a motivation
for human action. When people take actions that they believe to be
justified and consistent with some general image of themselves, they
are acting on the basis of meaning. They are motivated by the process
by which they reflect on past experience, plan future projects, and
organize the world about them. This rather general notion is
sufficient to distinguish meaning-motivated action from action based
on a material self-interest maximization or obedience to social norms.
The claim that the interpretive and constructive aspects of
thought are carried out exclusively within the minds of individuals
does not imply that these individuals create separate and uncon-
nected interpretations or meanings. As Husserl says,
Each one has his perceptions, his presentifications, his harmonious
experiences, devaluation of his certainties into mere possibilities, doubts, ques-
tions, illusions. But in living with one another, each one can take part in the
life of the others. Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men
but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is
straight-forwardly perceptual is commonalized.' 9
16. See HUSSERL, CARTESIAN IEDITATIONS, supra note 3, at 31-37; HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra
note 3, at 111-13, 247; see also ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD 45-
57 (George Walsh & Frederick Lehnert trans., 1967).
17. See HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 3, at 235-58. For a discussion of the concept of
linguistic meaning in Husseri's Logical Investigations, see Peter Simons, Meaning and
Language, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUSSERL, supra note 5, at 106, 106-25.
18. Compare SCHUTZ, supra note 16, at 69-96, with MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 4-
14 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
19. HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra note 3, at 163.
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In other words, the process of interpretation and construction is
intersubjective; although it occurs within the individual, each indi-
vidual's personal experience includes a vast range of social communi-
cations.20 These communications are the couriers of culture, both
interpersonally and intertemporally. They convey the interpretations
and constructions of all the people with whom the individual comes
into contact, either directly or indirectly, and all the people in the past
who have conveyed their interpretations and constructions to the
people in the present. As a result, intersubjective communications
are historically sedimented 2' and reflect the continuity of human
culture.
Because interpretations and social constructions that are
communicated intersubjectively are perceived as essential aspects of
the world, they will possess the world's pre-given, irrefutable charac-
ter for the individual. This experience probably occurs quite often,
since most of these lessons are taught to us before we learn to think,
and indeed make thinking possible. On the other hand, all intersub-
jective communications must ultimately be received and accepted by
the individual, which creates the possibility that they will be rejected.
This is the epistemological equivalent of Sartre's existential "no'--the
possibility, however slight, that an individual may reject any
intersubjectively communicated interpretation or construction.22 Only
the natural attitude, that is, one's belief in the existence of the world
itself, is truly irrefutable.
The particular pattern that these conflicting inclinations will
assume depends upon a variety of social and personal factors. An
interpretation or construction that is communicated to individuals at
an early age, that is tightly bound to other interpretations or con-
structions, or whose centrality is established by other intersubjective
communications, is likely to be treated as a pre-given aspect of the
world; as their connections or centrality decrease, these communica-
tions are more readily questioned or ignored by the individual.
Moreover, a person who is a partial outsider, a rebel, or a genius may
well choose to perceive even the most essential communication as
contingent. Thus, Husserl's analysis of the natural attitude provides
a framework that explains both the social construction of reality, in
20. See id. at 161-67, 244-57; HUSSERL, IDEAS, supra note 3, at 94.
21. See Husserl, The Origin of Geometry, supra note 3, at 361; see generally Husserl,
Vienna Lecture, supra note 3. Husserl does not use the term sedimentation in this lecture, but
it is one of his best statements of the concept.
22. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON PHENoMENOLOGICAL
ONTOLOGY 6-12 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).
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Berger and Luckmann's phrase, 2 and the existence of individuals who
deviate from the general pattern, no matter how comprehensive and
integrated it may seem.
III. RATIONAL ACTOR THEORY
In order to explain the relationship between Husserl's phe-
nomenology and rational actor theory, it will first be necessary to
determine precisely what claims rational actor theory advances.
Although its proponents often present this theory as an agreed-upon
methodology, it actually consists of several different layers that are
connected to one another more by mood, or by emotion, than by logical
necessity. These layers are methodological individualism, instrumen-
tal rationality, and self-interest maximization.
Methodological individualism asserts that all social structures
arise from the behavior of individual human beings, and are best ex-
plained in terms of that behavior. Human beings are the only
autonomous, active forces in the social world, and thus the only
source of explanation. When the only available building material is
brick, a building cannot be poured into a mold or assembled from pre-
fabricated modules; it must be built up, brick by brick. Similarly,
social structures arise from the behavior of individual human beings
and are best explained in terms of that behavior.24 Methodological
individualism does not, however, prohibit emergent phenomena-that
is, the features of collective entities that were not intended by the
individuals who comprise them. For example, to take Simmel's sim-
plest social unit-a dyad 5-Stan and Jan Mergatroid are a nice
couple, but they have a tendency to fight. Stan gets irritated easily,
which makes Jan more determined to have her own way, which gets
Stan even more irritated. The fights follow a describable and
somewhat predictable pattern, but they are not intended by either
Stan or Jan. It does not violate methodological individualism to
describe these fights as an emergent phenomenon. They result from
23. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REAITY:
A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 3(1966).
24. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOC, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTrrUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 11-15 (1962); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 5-9 (1971); Jon Elster,
Introduction, in RATIONAL CHOICE 1, 2-4 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); William Riker, Political Science
and Rational Choice, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 163, 171 (James Alt &
Kenneth Shepsle eds., 1990). The same approach is common to other theories, such as
behaviorism. See generally GEORGE HOMANS, THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1967).
25. See generally FORMAL SOCIOLOGY: WORK OF GEORGE SIMMEL (Larry Ray ed., 1991).
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individual behavior, although this behavior only occurs in a particular
social setting. Similarly, we can say that hierarchy occurs naturally
in society, provided that the claim is understood as a prediction that
real individuals, when placed in a particular context, will behave in
ways that generate a hierarchy.
What does violate methodological individualism are general
will theories, 6 as well as the casual but common practice of anthro-
pomorphizing collective entities: France has decided, Congress in-
tends, the working class demands. Of course, dispensing with these
locutions is awkward to the point of virtual impossibility. But we
should recognize that they are approximations, that there is necessar-
ily a better, more complete explanation in terms of individual behav-
ior. Thus, we can say that the Mergatroids have agreed to come to
dinner, an adequate statement in many situations. A preferable ac-
count, however, refers only to the actions of individuals; Jan took the
call, checked with Stan, then returned to the phone and said that they
would come.
The second layer in the rational actor model is utility maximi-
zation: the claim that social actors try to achieve their goals in the
most effective manner. This is essentially the same idea as Weber's
notion of instrumental rationality.2 7 It requires that people's prefer-
ences must be relatively stable over time, that they can be rank or-
dered, and that people try to maximize their satisfaction, as defined
by their preference set.28 As a model of human behavior, this can be
joined, naturally and rather effortlessly, with methodological indi-
vidualism, but there is no necessary connection between the two. 2 9
The concept of instrumental rationality does not require that
actors actually adopt the most effective strategy, but only that they
attempt to do so. Many impediments to optimal action may exist,
such as the cognitive limitations of an individual, the structural limi-
26. See, e.g., G. W. F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 13-18 (Robert Maynard Hutchins
ed., 1977); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (G.D.H. Cole
trans., 1950).
27. See WEBER, supra note 18, at 24-26.
28. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 9-21 (1951);
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 3-11 (1984); John C. Harsanyi, Advances in
Understanding Rational Behavior, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 24, at 82-102; Amartya Sen,
Behaviour and The Concept of Preference, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 24, at 60-81. One
standard theorem of rational action, for example, is that preferences are transitive; if a person
chooses apples over peaches, and peaches over broccoli, she will choose apples over broccoli.
29. One can treat collective entities as rational actors, in this sense, which is precisely
what positive political theory does when it explores the way that Congress and the judiciary
engage in a repeat player game, each trying to achieve its own policy preferences. See generally
PETER ORDESHooK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER (1992). One can also assert that all social
action must be traced to individuals, but that these individuals are essentially irrational.
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tations of an organization, or the lack of adequate information. In
other words, as Herbert Simon and Oliver Williamson have discussed,
the actor may only be boundedly rational.30 The extent to which such
bounded rationality approaches optimality depends upon the opera-
tion of external forces. Functionalism suggests that societies, al-
though composed of fallible, ignorant, even irrational individuals, will
be compelled to approach optimality by their need to survive in a
demanding environment and to maintain internal order.31
Neoclassical economists believe that the competitive market will
induce optimal behavior among firms by shaping those that are
adaptable, and eliminating those that are not.3 2 There is currently a
debate about whether phenomena such as path dependency will
perpetuate sub-optimal behavior over long periods of time.33
The third element in rational actor theory involves motivation.
Proponents of the theory believe that actors strive to maximize their
material self-interest.m This argument links naturally to
methodological individualism, although there is no logical reason why
it cannot be applied to collective entities. It is also easy to connect
with instrumental rationality; in effect, it provides the values which
the actor is attempting to achieve, or optimize. Of course, an
individual or organization can be instrumentally rational, but seek to
maximize some value other than material self-interest. This
distinction is well understood, but not always specified with clarity.35
As stated, methodological individualism and instrumental rationality
will be called rational action theory; when the additional element of
material self-interest maximizing is added, the theory will be called
rational choice.
30. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATwE BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1976); OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL
CONTRACTING (1985).
31. See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (rev. ed.
1968); A.R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A NATURAL SCIENCE OF SOCIETY (1948).
32. See generally ROBERT KUENNE, THE THEORY OF GENERAL ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
(1963).
33. See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE
ECONOMY (1994); Symposium, Path Dependence and Comparative Corporate Governance, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 317 (1996).
34. See, e.g., GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976);
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 24, at 31-39; OLSON, supra note 24, at 5-9. For example, a
person is rational if he prefers charity to sex, sex to wealth, and charity to wealth, but he is not
self-interested.
35. For an explication of this distinction, see generally John Ferejohn, Rationality and
Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO POLITICS: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY OF RATIONAL ACTION (Kristin Monroe
ed., 1991). Ferejohn uses the terms "thin" and "thick" to distinguish between the postulate of
rationality and the further postulate of material self-interest.
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The charm of material self-interest maximizing, as a motiva-
tion for rational action, is that it seems to lead us to the Holy Grail of
the social sciences, namely the ability to predict human behavior.
Maximizing behavior-the effort to get more and more of
something-is predictable because it means that the actor will keep
moving in the same direction, without being satiated or diverted. If
blocked in that forward movement by some obstacle, the actor will
seek the shortest path around the obstacle and then resume its prior
path.
Real predictability, however, requires that the value the actor
attempts to maximize must be observable by an outsider. Material
needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, and automobiles fit this re-
quirement nicely. In addition, there is the convenient empirical coin-
cidence, quite unrelated to the theory, that Western society provides a
generalized unit of exchange, namely money, that can be used to ac-
quire virtually any material item; thus, material self-interest is read-
ily measurable in terms of money. Hence the theory predicts that a
person, being rational, will choose more money over less.
Of course many counterexamples can be found. In an effort to
make the theory of material self-interest maximization more plausi-
ble, its proponents have fallen back upon the more general concept of
utility. Utility, however, eliminates the predictive power of the the-
ory. Since any action could maximize some internal value of the
actor, no definitive prediction can be made and no specific action can
be regarded as disconfirming the hypothesis. 6 Utility maximizing ac-
counts equally well for the behavior of the miser and the philanthro-
pist, the sybarite and the anchorite, the workaholic and the couch
potato, and thereby fails to account for anything at all. The concept
has meaning mainly as a moral critique of the claim that people
should sacrifice or castigate themselves in the service of some higher
principle, like God, king, or country.
36. See Bruce Fireman & William Gamson, Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization
Perspective, in THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, SOCIAL
CONTROL, AN) TACTICS 8, 32-36 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1988); GREEN &
SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 85-88.
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IV. THE OVERLAP BETWEEN RATIONAL ACTOR THEORY AND
PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenology begins from the same initial premise as ra-
tional actor theory, namely methodological individualism. Like the
rational actor and rational choice models, it locates all human action
within the individual. It thus gains the same epistemological advan-
tages, avoiding the mysticism of general will theories and generating
hypotheses that are testable by observing actual behavior. In fact,
phenomenology improves upon the rational actor model by explaining
why the individual is the proper basis for explanation. Rational ac-
tion is based on positivism, an approach that requires us to penetrate
below the level of large social structures in our explanatory efforts,
but does not tell us why we should end our descent at the level of the
individual. Would it not be preferable to know what creates the
individual's motivation, how human behavior is generated by the
physiological and psychological mechanisms that are ultimately more
fundamental, and more satisfying, explanations from a positivist
point of view? Microeconomics finesses this problem by asserting that
consumer preferences are purely subjective, to be determined by
observation and treated as exogenous variables.
In phenomenology, however, methodological individualism is
not based on the effort to explain as much as one can, and to stop
explaining when one's methodology has reached its limit, but rather
on the theoretically argued position that the human consciousness is
the irreducible arena of experience. It is useful to understand human
motivations or the physiology of the brain, just as it is useful to ob-
serve the emergent phenomena of larger social structures, but the
human mind is the necessary starting or ending point of these
inquiries. All psychological explanations flow into it, all social expla-
nations flow out of it, and then return to it. The mind processes and
transforms these inputs and outputs in ways that are unique to con-
sciousness. This explanation for methodological individualism estab-
lishes an orientation toward concepts that is not implicit in rational
actor theory, although it reaches essentially the same result.
Phenomenology is equally consistent with the instrumental
rationality component of rational action theory, although it again
establishes a more conceptual orientation. Human reason plays a
central role in Husserl's philosophy. The phenomenological reduction
is only possible through the use of reason, and one of the principle
purposes of the reduction is to explore the implications of the reason-
ing process. Reason is present within the natural attitude as well. In
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fact, it is precisely the same reason. What distinguishes the reduction
from the natural attitude is radical doubt, not reasoning capacity. Of
course, the natural attitude, unlike the phenomenological reduction,
does not consist entirely of reason; it encompasses the entire range of
human behavior, including emotions. But neither does rational actor
theory advance the unsupportable assertion that human action is
exclusively rational. Both approaches view reason as a capacity that
human beings deploy in certain circumstances.
At the empirical level, phenomenology strongly favors those
versions of instrumental rationality that emphasize its bounded na-
ture. This means that actors are limited by the information available
to them and by their own cognitive capacities. These limits are se-
vere, more severe than our rather abstract approach to organizations
generally suggests. Most people can only use one methodology, or
approach, at a time, and can only apply a small number of criteria
within that methodology. They have only a small amount of informa-
tion available to them, and if they had more, they could not assimilate
it. Their time is limited, because they have other things to do, they
are often tired, they have bad moods, they get headaches, or their
offices are too stuffy. These constraints on optimal decision making
often appear in studies of consumers or "street-level bureaucrats,"37
that is, people whom academics regard as ineffectual, low-functioning
types. In fact, such constraints apply to everybody. Everyone has
limited cognitive capacities, everybody must decide on the basis of
insufficient information, and everybody gets headaches.
Of course, various mechanisms can expand people's capacities
to achieve instrumental rationality. In an organization, records and
procedures augment individuals' memories; more generally, the writ-
ten records of society allow knowledge to cumulate through time.
This sedimentation process, moreover, incorporates the insights of
prior generations into the thought processes of the present one. Not
only does the average college physics major know more physics than
did Newton, but the average elementary school student also thinks
quite naturally in terms that towering geniuses like Newton struggled
to conceptualize.
Once again, however, all this collective knowledge does not
exist in some abstract realm, but must ultimately be activated and
applied by individuals. The limits on their cognition and information
demand that they develop ways to make instrumental decisions
within these straightened circumstances. They do so by means of
37. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVELBUREAUCRACY 3 (1980).
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simplifications, images, approximations, and the like. We sometimes
call these devices metaphors, a term which implies that they are
quasi-poetic, sub-optimal, or distorted ways of understanding reality.
At other times, we call them concepts, suggesting that they are ways
of seeing through reality to some underlying truth. From the phe-
nomenological perspective they are simply the machinery of thought,
the devices that people must employ within the natural attitude.
Thus the best term is probably heuristics, which is relatively neutral.
All human thought, being individual thought, is necessarily limited by
cognitive and informational constraints, and must therefore proceed
by means of approximation or heuristics.38
New institutional analysis relies upon phenomenology to em-
phasize a further limit on liuman rationality. No person can create
her own interpretation of the world,3 9 just as no person can create a
private language. While particular interpretations are within the
capacities of individuals, interpretations of the world as a whole de-
pend upon an intersubjective social process. They congeal into pat-
terns, institutional structures, and elaborated conceptions that each
individual learns as he develops from a clueless little infant into a
fully competent member of society. For the most part, they appear to
the individual as pre-given, like reality itself. This places a further
limit beyond cognitive capacity and information availability on each
individual's instrumental rationality, his ability to find optimal ways
to achieve his goals.
The scope of this further limit is also a matter of intense de-
bate at present. Social determinists of various kinds argue that all
thought is culturally determined, that pre-given social mechanisms
determine the context and the content of individual action. This
position does not necessarily preclude instrumental rationality, but it
demands fairly heroic claims about external constraints that compel
38. See Husserl, Origin of Geometry, supra note 3, at 353; see also HUSSERL, CRISIS, supra
note 3, at 21-59. Precisely how extensively heuristics are employed is a matter of debate among
those who acknowledge their centrality. Husserl believed that mathematics, despite its
historically sedimented origins, represented precise knowledge, while Wittgenstein asserted
that it was just as heuristic as an intellectually despicable subject such as law. See LUDWIG
WrrTGENSTEIN, PHIIOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 82-88 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958). Within
institutional economics, Oliver Williamson restricts heuristics more narrowly than Douglass
North does, having greater confidence in the disciplining power of the market. Compare
Douglass North, Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3, 36-53 (1990) (explaining the role of both informal and formal societal
constraints), with WILLIAMSON, supra note 30, at 15-63 (discussing the role of the market in
constraining society). For present purposes, these disagreements need not be resolved. In the
realm of politics, heuristics would appear to be universal and inescapable.
39. See THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 15-27 (Walter Powell &
Paul DiMaggio eds., 1991).
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societies to develop rational norms. Some rational actor and rational
choice theorists stand at the opposite extreme, arguing that individu-
als generally act to achieve their goals in an optimal manner, and that
cultural norms only affect their explanations for their actions. The
more recent and more modulated approach acknowledges the influ-
ence of social norms on individual behavior, but tries to explain the
creation of these norms in terms of rational action.
Phenomenology suggests a somewhat different intermediate
position. Social patterns, institutions and conceptualizations, com-
municated intersubjectively and sedimented by history, often deter-
mine human action. Given the limited cognitive and informational
resources of an individual, such factors will generally function as pre-
given aspects of the world. They are not absolutely pre-given, how-
ever, the way the world's essential reality is pre-given in the natural
attitude. Since all thought takes place within the mind of the indi-
vidual, even the most compelling cultural norms are nothing more
than individual thoughts. A particular person can always choose to
violate a norm and adopt behavior that achieves her goals in a more
effective manner than the norm would generally allow. The very
same capacity that enables people to develop norms and apply such
norms secures the possibility that those norms can be ignored or
violated. Large masses of people who conform to social norms carry
the flow of history, but that history is punctuated by individuals who
achieve political influence, military success, or economic wealth by
ignoring such norms and achieving their goals through previously
unimagined means. This behavior is not restricted to the famous;
alongside the mute, inglorious Milton in Gray's country churchyard
lies a "Cromwell, guiltless of his country's blood,"40 and perhaps a
weak, ineffectual Sulla, Frederick II, or Napoleon besides.
Phenomenology suggests, therefore, that the pre-given nature of
social norms and the ability of individuals to reject those norms in
favor of a more instrumental rationality interact in complex ways.
The ultimate result will be determined by the strength of the norms,
their interconnection with other norms, the amount of punishment
administered or advantage gained as a result of their abandonment,
the psychology of the particular individual, and her position within
the society.
40. THOMAS GRAY, Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard, in POEMS PUBLISHED IN 1768
109, 114 (Arthur F. Bell ed., Frowde 1909) (1768).
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V. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN RATIONAL ACTOR THEORY AND
PHENOMENOLOGY
The final element of rational actor theory is rational choice:
the assertion that people are primarily motivated by material self-
interest, that self-interest provides the goal which each individual
tries to achieve through instrumental rationality. Phenomenology
takes direct issue with the claim that this goal supplies the primary
motive for human behavior. According to phenomenology, human
beings do not try to maximize material self-interest but to invest their
lives with meaning. Their conscious efforts are designed to fit into a
pattern that they recognize as possessing inherent or deontological
value, with their concept of value being derived from the complex
interaction of social norms and personal aspirations. People take
actions that contribute to this sense of meaning, and abjure actions
that oppose it, regardless of the material consequences. This account
of human behavior possesses limited predictive power, but that fact
may only mean that predicting the full range of human behavior ex-
ceeds our capabilities. The assumption that all such behavior will
conform to a predictive theory because of our thirst for prediction
violates the positivist premise of the entire effort.
Those who favor theories based upon material self-interest
sometimes point to the universal, culturally independent nature of
material needs. There is no doubt that human beings are animals,
with real and relatively similar physical needs, but there are numer-
ous macro-empirical observations indicating that people's behavior is
not always governed by those needs. The basic human need for food
does not prevent people from voluntarily starving themselves, either
for the salvation of their souls or the improvement of their figures. In
prior times, moreover, people ritualized food in a manner that has no
connection with material needs; the one Bronze Age religion that
remains common in the Western World, namely Judaism, reveals in
its kosher rules the luxuriant development of non-material behaviors
that were attached to food for meaning's sake. Survival would appear
to be an even more basic instinct, but many people commit suicide,
engage in terrorist activity against overwhelming odds, take excessive
risks for thrills, or cast away their lives in battle. Looking back
across the course of history, we see the free people of Chartres
harnessing themselves to wagons in order to haul stones for the
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construction of their vast cathedral;41 the Mayan kings cutting holes
in their tongues and penises and hurling children into the cenotes;42
the ancient Jews engaging in suicidal war against the Romans to keep
the emperor's statue out of their temples;43 and at the very dawn of
history, neolithic people pausing in their desperate struggle for
existence to dig shallow graves, and using their meager material
surpluses for red pigment to decorate their ancestors' bones. Very
often, people seem to respond less to the appeal of material self-
interest than to the voice of an awakened consciousness that screams
"what is the meaning of it all?"
Beyond simple, material needs, moreover, identifying the
nature of interest itself becomes problematic. The value of many
material objects that people seek is based primarily on complex
cultural patterns. Some intrinsic value attaches to having a large
house as opposed to an adequate one, but what is the value of having
a fancy house? And what is the value of a person's stamp collection,
on which he spends resources that could otherwise be spent on more
food, a larger house, or better clothes? We can account for these
motivations in terms of meaning, or in economic language, subjective
personal utility. Human interests are constructed by people's desire
to make sense of their lives, a desire that is in turn constructed by
both intersubjective and individual forces.
Phenomenological analysis does not deny that people are
sometimes strongly motivated by the desire to maximize their mate-
rial self-interest. It suggests, however, that they will engage in such
activity when it possesses meaning for them. Self-interest maximiz-
ing behavior is common in the contemporary western world because it
comports with prevailing belief systems.44 Our political leaders, quite
unlike those in prior eras, declare that their goal is to improve the
material well-being of the populace. Our most important non-gov-
ernmental institutions, for-profit corporations, are organized exclu-
sively to maximize the monetary wealth of the corporation's owners,
and their managers generally would be dismissed if they admitted
any other goal. This is historically atypical, in part because profit-
making firms were rarely the most important private organizations in
41. See HENRY ADAMS, MONT-SAINT-MIcHEL AND CHARTRES 101-02 (1936); OTTO VON
SIMSON, THE GoTHic CATHEDRAL 163-65 (1956).
42. See LiNDA ScHELE & DAVID FREiDEL, A FOREST OF KiNGS 89-91, 111, 202, 266-86
(1990); cf J. ERIC S. THOMPSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF MAYA CIVILIZATION 133-35 (1954).
43. See JosEPHUs, THE JEWISH WAR (G.P. Goold ed. & H. St. J. Thackeray trans., 1997).
44. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIc AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALiSM
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
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other cultures, and in part because even those firms that did exist
often justified themselves on other grounds. Hard-core proponents of
rational choice theory strive to refute or reinterpret macro-empirical
evidence of non-self-interested behavior; the undeniable point,
however, is that this theory itself happens to have emerged in the one
society where rational, self-interest maximizing is a powerful and
generally-held belief. Phenomenology suggests that all the
evidence-the prevalence of self-interest maximizing in our own
society, the explicit adoption of this motivation as a value in that
same society, the absence of this value and the corresponding
examples of differently motivated behavior in other societies, and the
prevalence of the position among scholars in our society that self-
interest maximizing is universal and people in other societies are
lying-is best explained by the position that meaning is the
predominant motivation of human action.
The sacrifices of the people of Chartres in rebuilding their
great cathedral following the disastrous fire of 1194 provide an exam-
ple. The cathedral was the center of the Mary cult in France and
housed the Sacred Tunic-the shift that Mary wore when she gave
birth to Jesus. It was also a major pilgrimage site and trade fair
sponsor that was responsible for the town's economic prosperity;
selling reproductions of the Sacred Tunic enabled the people of
Chartres to develop a thriving textile industry. A rational choice
approach might suggest that the people's extraordinary efforts to
rebuild the cathedral were instrumental in nature, designed to maxi-
mize their material self-interest. Clearly, we should not ignore this
motivation in our admiration and nostalgia for the intensity of the
people's religious faith. But it does not explain why Chartres became
a pilgrimage site, it does not explain why the pilgrims would pay
money for items such as a reproduction of the Sacred Tunic, it does
not explain why the rebuilding effort, which was often voluntary, did
not collapse as a result of free rider problems, and most important of
all, it does not explain the personal experience of the citizens them-
selves.45 Their observable behavior and internal states are only
explicable in terms of a larger context of meaning. This theory of
45. See VON SIMSON, supra note 41, at 164-70. While recounting the economic reasons for
the people's efforts, Simson never doubts their religious fervor. Indeed, his point is not that the
people were motivated by economic self-interest, but that we twentieth century observers, who
are accustomed to distinguishing between economic self-interest and religious fervor, cannot
fully understand how the two were integrated in the Middle Ages. In the final analysis, the
people's "rapport with the supernatural explains the mood and public effort that created the
Cathedral of Chartres." Id. at 169.
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meaning does not deny the existence of self-interest; it simply
determines when that motivation will be activated. People will
pursue their material self-interest in the many not invariable
situations where they find self-interest to be meaningful.
The phenomenological account of human beings as motivated
by their desire to create meaning also accounts for the micro-empiri-
cal data developed in the laboratory studies. One of the most robust
conclusions from these studies is the endowment effect-the tendency
of people to attach additional value to an object simply because they
already possess it. In one experiment, Kahneman and Tversky
showed one group of subjects a coffee mug and asked them how much
they would pay for it. The mean answer was $2.21. They then gave
another group the same mug as their own property and asked them
how much they would accept to sell the mug. This time, the mean
answer was $5.78.46
This behavior can be labeled "irrational," but phenomenology
offers an affirmative explanation. As suggested above, a central as-
pect of meaning is the definition of the self, a process which includes
the delineation of one's boundaries. These boundaries are not fixed by
nature; they are socially constructed by an intersubjective process
that varies from one culture to another. In our culture, the definition
of the self clearly includes the person's property, as Meir Dan-Cohen
has observed.47 The reason for the endowment effect, phenomenology
suggests, is that a physical object, once it becomes a person's property
in a culturally well-recognized sense, becomes part of her definition of
herself as well. It is only a small and perhaps marginal part of her-
self, admittedly, but that is why the additional value that is attached
to it is only three dollars and fifty-seven cents. If the coffee mug were
given to the person for being the valedictorian of her high school, it
might be given an additional value of $3,000.
In addition to providing a positive explanation for the endow-
ment effect, phenomenology also provides a way to trace its limits.
The contribution of Jeffrey Rachlinski and Forest Jourden to this
Symposium suggests that when a person's ownership of an object is
not definitive but subject to defeasance, the endowment effect disap-
pears.48 The potential defeasance of the person's right of ownership
46. See Daniel Kalmeman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1336-38 (1990).
47. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV.
959, 979-81 (1992).
48. See Jeffrey Rachlinski & Forest Jourdan, Remedies and The Psychology of Ownership,
51 VAND. L. REv. 1541 (1998).
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places it outside the boundary of the self. Similarly, being given a
voucher that can be exchanged for a mug, rather than the mug itself,
dampens the effect. Dan-Cohen explains these variations in terms of
the self's scalarity; rather than being a binary process, with every-
thing classifiable as self or not-self, the self is a scalar process, where
things can be more or less a part of oneself.49 An object to which one
has a definitive right is more a part of oneself than an object to which
one's right is contingent. Defining oneself as an entrepreneur who
trades in a commodity, rather than an individual who owns it, is also
likely to eliminate the endowment effect, because the act of selling the
item, rather than of continuing to possess it, represents the sells
relationship to that object. Kahneman and Tversky's subjects became
attached to a coffee mug, but a pet store owner readily sells puppies
and kittens at the market price. Perhaps an experimental subject,
given five mugs and told that his task was to maximize his income
from the sale of the mugs, would offer to sell them to the experi-
menter at the market price.
Russell Korobkin's contribution concludes that experimental
subjects playing the role of a lawyer prefer to retain contract terms
that the client already possesses, either because those terms are the
default rule or because they are part of an existing industry form.50
But a contract term seems too abstract to display endowment effects,
and an agent would be unlikely to experience such effects on behalf of
the client. Instead, Korobkin concludes that the preference results
from a status quo bias that he ascribes to the subject's desire to avoid
regret. That is, the subject prefers to forgo an opportunity to reach an
economically superior deal to avoid the possibility that he has given
up something of value.51 This behavior might also result from rational
risk aversion-a lawyer might believe that his client is less likely to
be upset about an opportunity forgone than about the surrender of a
right that it originally possessed. The latter effect, however, is likely
to be weak in an experimental situation, where there is no real client;
more importantly, it assumes a degree of cynicism that is characteris-
tic of rational actor explanations, but does not conform with empirical
experience. Lawyers generally cathect with their client, and try to
represent the client's interests unless some special circumstance
arises. This is the approach that phenomenology suggests. The
49. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 47, at 965, 978-82.
50. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiations: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1591, 1607
(1998).
51. See id. at 1619-20.
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desire to avoid regret follows naturally; a lawyer's self-image typically
involves the protection of his client's rights, and the avoidance of
outright miscalculations. A subject playing the role of an
entrepreneur, or an agent oriented toward business development,
might not display the same preference for the status quo.
Finally, both Christine Jolls and Robert Rasmussen rely upon
people's excessive optimism in their analyses. Jolls concludes that
this bias might lead people to underestimate the likelihood that they
will be liable for a tort, 2 while Rasmussen concludes that it may lead
them to underestimate the likelihood that the firm they manage or
invest in will go bankrupt. 3 This can be called optimism, although
the subjects might not be similarly sanguine about events uncon-
nected with themselves, such as the future of the economy or foreign
relations. Their attitudes are probably better explained in phe-
nomenological terms. Their projects and plans become part of them-
selves, or their self-image of themselves, and so become endowed with
additional value. The strength of this effect might vary with the indi-
vidual's degree of ego-involvement with the project. Thus, the effect
might be particularly strong for Rasmussen's entrepreneur starting
up a small, new company, and weaker for a venture capitalist who is
investing in a group of companies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Husser's phenomenology, and specifically his analysis of the
natural attitude, provides a comprehensive theory of conscious behav-
ior. A number of such theories exist, of course, but phenomenology
accounts for both the empirical strength of the rational actor and
rational choice models, and for the strength of the macro-empirical
and micro-empirical critiques of those models. It defines the general
areas where the rational actor models apply, and identifies the limits
of those models, the territory where these models no longer thrive, but
begin to lose their way, sputter, and expire from implausibility.
Phenomenology also offers an account of what motivates people in the
absence of self-interest. This account, moreover, does not postulate
two sets of inconsistent motivations that switch on or off in some
mysterious way, but rather subsumes self-interest as part of a larger
52. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1661-62 (1998).
53. See Robert K Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of
Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1694 (1998).
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motivational system. Rational action and rational choice models, of
course, still have numerous adherents who are unprepared to make
any concessions. But as the empirical evidence against their view
continues to mount, and the defenses of these theories' responses
become increasingly convoluted, an alternative account that inte-
grates their approach into a more plausible totality seems increas-
ingly appealing.

